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Abstract 
The neuroscientific field of ‘resting state’ research has been described as heralding a 
paradigm shift in functional neuroimaging. As this new field has been central to the 
development of a cognitive neuroscientific theory of inner mental life, we here map and 
analyse its emergence and potential implications for conceptualizations of brain, self and 
subjectivity within and beyond the neurosciences. The paper traces how the ‘the resting 
state’ and ‘default mode’ became visible as objects of scientific enquiry through the 
yoking together of what were initially separate research endeavours addressing different 
neurophysiological and neuropsychological questions. In the process, ‘rest’ – as 
signifying the cessation of movement or labour – has been transformed: the brain, inner 
mental life – and potentially the self – are conceptualized by researchers in this field as 
perpetually productive and oriented towards the future.  
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1 Introduction 
 In 2009, the Journal of Neuroscience commemorated the 40
th
 anniversary of the 
Society for Neuroscience by asking a number of prominent neuroscientists to reflect on 
the changes within the field over the past 40 years. Marcus Raichle announced in his 
paper that there had recently been nothing less than a paradigm shift in functional 
neuroimaging (Raichle, 2009). Raichle contrasted two perspectives on brain function, 
each of which, he contended, has had a long and complex history. According to one 
perspective, the brain ‘is primarily reflexive, driven by the momentary demands of the 
environment’; according to the other, ‘the brain’s operations are mainly intrinsic 
involving the maintenance of information for interpreting, responding to and even 
predicting environmental demands’ (p. 12729) . It is the former perspective that has 
characterized much of the corpus of experimental and theoretical research within the 
neurosciences. The latter perspective explicitly departs from most models of the brain 
that have characterized cognitive neuroscience.  For much of the last century, this 
perspective was the neuroscientific underdog. 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
  Over the course of the first decade of the twenty-first century, discussions 
regarding the brain – both within and especially beyond the neurosciences – have 
arguably been most preoccupied with and excited by three poles of research: (i) on 
neuroplasticity and neurogenesis, which describe the brain's capacity to reorganize itself 
by forming new neural connections throughout life, and the formation of new neurons in 
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the mature brain (Malabou, 2008; Rubin, 2009); (ii) a renewed focus on emotion/affect – 
as a remedy for the excision of these phenomena from earlier, overly cognitive models of 
brain and hence of self (see the research of Jaak Panksepp (1998), Antonio Damasio 
(Moss and Damasio, 2001; 1994; Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 2004), and Joseph LeDoux 
(1996; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005)); and (iii) on mirror neurons and, more generally, 
social neuroscience – the neural mechanisms of shared understanding and 
communications (for a review of mirror neuron research see: Rizzolatti and Craighero 
(2004), and for social neuroscience see: Lieberman (2007)). In complex articulation with 
these neuroscientific developments, the social sciences and humanities have been 
experiencing an efflorescence of theoretical and empirical research on the self and 
subjectivity that engages many of the same terms – for example, affect, empathy, and 
embodiment – that are currently common currency within the neurosciences. (Indeed, it is 
possible that the excitement surrounding neuroscientific research on mirror neurons and 
affect has, to date, been greater in fields outside of the neurosciences than within them.) 
Some of this research in the humanities and social sciences includes the creative use, 
translation and reworking of research findings, as well as more general concepts, from 
the neurosciences (e.g., Connolly (2002), Massumi (2002), Hansen (2004)). (For a 
consideration of the potential as well as the difficulties associated with these 
interdisciplinary engagements see (Cromby, 2007) and (Papoulias and Callard, 2010).) It 
is our contention that the brain – as it is being conceptualized and modelled by the 
neurosciences, as well as disseminated beyond them – is in the process of being reframed 
by a fourth potent arm of research, that on the brain’s resting state and its default mode of 
function.  
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 This emergent field is little more than a decade old. It comprises research on the 
brain in the absence of any explicit task, termed the ‘resting state,’ or ‘default mode,’ 
which has given rise to interest in the ‘default mode network’ (DMN), a set of brain 
regions that effectively underlie a novel core of cognitive function. In this paper, we map 
and analyse this emergent research field. Our intention is twofold. First, we trace the 
emergence of ‘rest’ and ‘the resting state’ as objects of scientific enquiry, and, in so 
doing, indicate how such scientific constructs challenge – as well as pay certain debts to – 
existing models of subject-environment interaction that are constituted within cognitive 
neuroscience. Second, we reflect on potential implications of such research for 
conceptualizations of subjectivity and of the self that coalesce in fields adjacent as well as 
distal to the neurosciences.  
Findings from this new research field are beginning to circulate through various 
media channels. We write at a moment in which articles with such titles as ‘The restless 
brain’ (Jarrett, 2009), ‘Devoted to distraction’ (Glausiusz, 2009), ‘Daydream achiever’ 
(Lehrer, 2008), ‘Perchance to daydream … and degenerate’ (Valeo, 2008) and ‘You are 
who you are by default’ (Saey, 2009) are beginning to disseminate research concerning 
the resting state and the default mode network to various publics. It is precisely because 
processes of diffusion, dissemination and translation have only recently begun – and 
hence that the paths that such diffusion and translation will take are as yet 
underdetermined – that we consider it important to delineate some of the directions of 
travel, the consolidation of constructs, and the openings, as well as the potential perils, 
that such a field offers to those beyond its borders. The rapidity of dissemination and 
translation of research on mirror neurons is instructive in this regard. That the 
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experimental corpus on mirror neurons was both small and specific did not slow the 
speed with which mirror neurons were incorporated into hypotheses and models being 
developed in other neuroscientific fields, e.g. (Dapretto et al, 2006; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 
1998; Williams et al, 2001). And it was certainly no block to the excitement with which 
‘mirror neurons’ were greeted and set to work by diverse researchers within the social 
sciences and humanities, e.g. (Stafford, 2007; Orbach, 2009; Thrift, 2008).  
We suggest that just as was the case with mirror neurons and neuroscientific 
research on affect, resting state/default mode network research is likely within the next 
few years to find a ready general audience and wide cultural currency both within and 
beyond academic circles. And, as with mirror neurons and affect, these movements of 
concepts and scientific findings are likely to entail a creative engagement with – and 
hence transformation of – the specific scientific premises and formulations exchanged by 
scientists within the field itself. It does not escape our notice that we are complicit in the 
wider dissemination of such research through the very writing of this paper. Our paper 
comprises a cross-disciplinary collaboration between a neuroscientist within the field of 
resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research and a cultural 
theorist with expertise in the history and living present of psychiatry. Our positions 
within and to one side of the scientific field of resting state research allow us, we believe, 
to offer insights, cautionary as well as enthusiastic, regarding the potential that this field 
holds for reorienting some of the existing models through which subjectivity and brain-
self-environment relations have been understood.  
We are also aware that some of our conjectures regarding the ways in which 
resting state research findings might come to reorient conceptualizations of ‘self’ are 
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somewhat speculative. Nonetheless, we believe that this speculative wager will pay off if 
it encourages further critical reflection on the extent to which, and the means through 
which, neuroscience might play a part in moulding conceptualizations of the self. Nikolas 
Rose (Rose, 2007; Rose, 1998) and Emily Martin (Martin, 2007), amongst others, have 
demonstrated intricate and two-way relationships between (neuro)scientific constructs 
relating to the self and conceptualizations of the self that circulate in other domains. We 
consider, in the specific context of resting state research, how such relationships are in 
the very process of being forged. We leave to our readers the question of whether our 
analyses adumbrate or, rather, actively intervene in this process.  
 
2 Revolutions of a restless neuroscience  
The claims now being made on behalf of resting state research – as Raichle’s 
announcement of a paradigm shift (Raichle, 2009) makes clear – wish to underline its 
historically revolutionary status.
1
 But, notably, the claims for newness and the excitement 
surrounding this field are conjoined with an emphasis on its revivification of a hitherto 
submerged perspective on brain function. Indeed, Raichle, in proclaiming the impending 
paradigm shift, dwells on how ‘surprising discoveries’ (p. 12729) in imaging research 
have opened up a new chapter in what has actually been an historically long-standing 
interest in exploring the behavioural relevance of intrinsic brain activity. He leans, here, 
on the genealogy presented by the eminent neuroscientist and physiologist Rodolfo 
Llinás (2001). Llinás contrasts the work of William James and the famous 
neurophysiologist Charles Sherrington with that of Sherrington’s disciple, T. Graham 
Brown. James and Sherrington conceptualized the central nervous system as 
   
7 
 
fundamentally reflexive, in which ‘the brain is essentially a complex input/output system 
driven by the momentary demands of the environment’ (Llinás, 2001, p. 6) . In contrast, 
Brown argued that the spinal cord ought not to be understood as reflexological, and 
indeed that movement could be intrinsically generated in the absence of sensory input:  
 
It is therefore possible to look upon the neuraxial unit as the efferent neurone and not 
as the reflex arc, and to regard as the primitive activity not the reflex but that 
rhythmic phenomenon of which there still remain examples in the acts of progression 
and re- spiration. (Brown, 1914, p. 45) [italics added] 
 
Brown’s prime focus was on the rhythmic and intrinsic organization of gait: he argued 
that his research demonstrated that the conditioning of rhythmic activity is largely self-
generated, such that sensory input modulates but does not determine it. He thus refocuses 
our conceptual lenses away from the phenomenon of the reflex arc and towards that of 
rhythmic intrinsic organization. Llinás argues that Brown’s insights on spinal cord 
function may be extrapolated to the operations of the brainstem and areas of higher brain 
function. On this view of the brain, sensory input ‘modulates rather than informs’ (Llinás, 
2001, p. 7) intrinsic nervous system function. Such a view runs counter to many 
theoretical frameworks employed by various disciplines in the course of the twentieth 
century to understand and model the human brain and cognition, not least behaviourism, 
orthodox cognitive psychology, and later cognitive neuroscience. Indeed, such a view 
entails a potential reconfiguring of the articulation between brain, self and environment – 
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or between internal and external world – from the one familiar to us from cognitive 
science.  
Resting state research, in explicitly allying itself with Brown over Sherrington, 
positions itself on one side of a long running duel, one whose axis centres on the 
opposition between the reflexive and the intrinsic. The field is also, of course, indebted to 
other scientific concepts, models and approaches.  A genealogical approach to the 
problematics engaged by ‘resting state’ research would need to contend with Bichat’s 
formulations regarding life as a collection of processes that resist death; with research on 
homeostasis in the early twentieth century by Walter Cannon and others; and with the 
cybernetic models of homeostasis that were such a fertile resource for cognitive science 
and systems theory.
2
  
But how did rest and ‘the resting state’ emerge as topics of explicit scientific 
enquiry within neuroscience? In this section, we provide a brief history (see also Buckner 
et al, 2008), paying particular attention to some of the manoeuvring of different 
neuroscientific sub-disciplines, and to the moments at which initially distinct constructs 
and terms coalesced. Of particular interest are the two distinct paths – with distinct 
methodologies, techniques and fields of expertise – out of which the field as we know it 
today has been constituted: cognitive psychology and neurophysiology. We contend that, 
over the course of the last decade, the terminology employed within this field has been 
transformed – in the process moving to vocabulary that is less contentious, arguably more 
tightly bounded, and primed for a neuroscientific framing of inner mental life. 
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2.1 History of resting state research: Lineage 1 – ‘default mode’ 
For cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists, a cross with arms of equal length 
(Figure 1) signifies a classic condition for the control state during an experiment. It is the 
state of rest, a neutral state, baseline, the moment of ‘crosshair fixation’. For cognitive 
neuroscience, this state has long been on the opposing side of the cognition it aimed to 
study.  
 
***** INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
Most categories of study in cognitive neuroscience emerged from a century-old 
lineage of experimental psychology. The traditional approach in neuroimaging studies, 
both in positron emission tomography (PET) and continuing with fMRI, was the contrast 
of a specific state (e.g. visual stimulus, sustained attention, memory retrieval) with a state 
in which subjects were simply asked to rest. Depending on the experimental condition, 
this ‘resting-state’ could be with eyes closed, eyes open, or fixation on a crosshair. Rest 
was implicitly considered a cognitive baseline against which task demands elevated brain 
activity in function-specific regions (Figure 2). 
 
***** INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
Gordon Shulman and colleagues at Washington University in St. Louis (one of the 
foremost institutions in the field of cognitive neuroscience) systematically noted some 
regions of the brain consistently appeared to decrease in activity across a variety of task 
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conditions. In 1997, they published their findings in the Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, showing in a meta-analysis of nine different PET studies that a distribution 
of regions including the medial prefrontal, posterior cingulate / precuneus, and lateral 
parietal cortex were more active when subjects were resting (Figure 3) (Shulman et al, 
1997). This paper also argued that while a passive control condition in the experimental 
design might for some appear to be ‘too underspecified’ to act as a reliable control, their 
analysis indicated that ‘passive conditions’ across a wide variety of experiments 
produced a ‘consistent set of blood flow changes’ and could thereby serve as a control 
state (p. 657). Notably, Shulman and colleagues also ruminated on the blood flow 
decreases caused by ongoing processes in the passive mental state, suggesting the 
possibility of unconstrained verbal thought processes, monitoring of the external 
environment, and monitoring of the body image. (Such constructs would, notably, return 
in later attempts to theorize what is happening cognitively when the brain is ‘at rest’.) 
They explicitly considered that processes in the ‘passive condition’ might have an 
‘antithetical relationship’ to active task processes (as sleep is antithetical to an alert state, 
a ‘general exploratory/monitoring state’ might be antithetical to a task-focused state). 
This shift – which we shall term ‘The Flipping of Contrasts’ – was very simple 
analytically (subtracting – or ‘contrasting’ – the task condition from rest, rather than the 
standard subtraction of the resting condition from task), but it presented cognitive 
neuroscience with the substantial conceptual problem of how to make sense of the data. If 
a large swath of cortex is more active during a state of rest, what is happening 
psychologically during rest that is driving this increased activity? 
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***** INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
The term ‘default mode’ entered the cognitive neuroscience vocabulary to describe 
the functional state of rest, in the contemporary sense, with Marcus Raichle’s and 
colleagues’ publication of three papers in 2001 (Gusnard et al, 2001; Gusnard and 
Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al, 2001).
3
 Many of these task-induced decreases in brain 
activity appeared to be ‘largely task independent, varying little in their location across a 
wide range of tasks’. Such consistency made them consider whether there might be ‘an 
organized mode of brain function that is present as a baseline or default state and is 
suspended during specific goal-directed behaviours’ (Gusnard et al, 2001, p. 4259). 
Through a semiotic linking of functional neuroanatomy to the regions found to be more 
active during rest, several hypotheses were proposed regarding the psychological content 
of the resting state. Debra Gusnard and colleagues postulated that the observed medial 
prefrontal cortex activity reflected the predominance of self-referential mental activity 
(also observed to implicate the medial prefrontal cortex) that occurs in the absence of 
environmental demands. They furthermore tentatively proposed that such activity was 
involved in the ‘processing of such representations that embody aspects of self’ (Gusnard 
et al, 2001, p. 4263) [italics added], and linked such processing to the concept of the 
autobiographical self proposed by Damasio (Damasio, 2000) and that of the narrative self 
proposed by the philosopher Shaun Gallagher (Gallagher, 2000). Gusnard and Raichle’s 
review in Nature Reviews Neuroscience (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001) elaborated their 
theory of a default mode of brain function based in neurophysiological, as well as 
psychological questions, thus invigorating long-neglected research questions regarding 
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internally-driven mental states. These three papers were central – and not solely in terms 
of their inauguration of a new research field. For they indicated that one ‘useful way’ to 
address the ‘important concept’ of the self was ‘to further explore the nature of default 
state activity’ (Gusnard et al, 2001, p. 4263): in so doing, these authors established an 
enduring and intimate tie between the resting state and investigation of the neural 
architecture of the self.  
It would take us too far afield from the central concerns of this paper adequately to 
address the numerous research findings and debates regarding the default mode since 
2001.
 
What follows is a schematic outline of some themes that are most critical to the 
arguments of this paper, along with brief indications of the methods employed.  
(i) Goal-directedness: While activity during the default mode was initially set in 
opposition to ‘goal-directed behaviour’ (Shulman et al, 1997), it was subsequently 
reconceptualised as involved in long-term, goal-directed planning, as numerous studies 
hypothesized its role in prospection, or future-oriented thinking (Spreng et al, 2009). 
While the task paradigms for interrogating these cognitive faculties did not differ from 
traditional cognitive neuroscience methodologies, it is the focus on unravelling the 
function of regions within the default mode network that was novel.  
(ii) Quantification of stimulus-independent thoughts and the invigoration of 
research on mind-wandering: More recently, we have witnessed the coalescence of 
research on the default mode network with other cross-disciplinary areas of research. 
Most notably, previously dispersed research on stimulus-independent thoughts, task-
unrelated thoughts and ‘zone outs’ has been gathered together under the umbrella term of 
‘mind-wandering’ (Smallwood et al, 2008; Mason et al, 2007; Gilbert et al, 2007; 
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Christoff et al, 2009; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Through such research, 
phenomena such as mind-wandering, which have previously been marginal to the 
theorisations of brain and self undertaken by cognitive science, have been installed as far 
more fundamental. Mason and colleagues’ study in Science, for example, contended that 
mind-wandering constitutes ‘a psychological baseline that emerges when the brain is 
otherwise unoccupied’ and that is underpinned by activity in a default network of cortical 
regions (Mason et al, 2007, p. 394). (That the dissemination of such research into the 
public sphere is undertaken via the use of such statements as ‘Daydreaming seems to be 
the default setting of the human mind’ (Fox, 2007) underlines how such research is 
effecting a shift away from a model of the self oriented towards external goals so beloved 
by orthodox cognitive psychology.)  
In terms of methods, the study by Mason and colleagues, which aimed to address 
‘the relationship between the default network and mind-wandering’ (Mason et al, 2007, 
p. 394), measured the frequency of stimulus independent thoughts during auditory and 
visuospatial working memory tasks, then correlated the scores with the level of task-
induced deactivation. Although the task remained the same, the analysis now focused on 
the frequency of lapsed attention, rather than moment-to-moment attention.  In other 
words, just as with the initial ‘Flipping of the Contrasts’, such studies required no 
fundamental methodological or technological breakthroughs, but rather a refocusing of 
scientists’ analytical gaze on what was hitherto regarded as unworthy of specific 
attention.   
 (iii) Self-related processing, episodic memory, social cognition and sense of 
agency: Topics of inner rumination, reflection, motivation have been subsumed under the 
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heading of default mode function, using findings from task-based studies to support the 
specialized roles of the implicated regions (Spreng et al, 2009; Goldberg et al, 2008; 
Schilbach et al, 2008; Moll et al, 2007). Much support has been drawn from the rationale 
that the content of mind-wandering is composed of episodic memory, prospection, and 
the consideration of social relationships. Given the diversity of roles attributed to the 
regions of the default mode network (DMN), more recent work has attempted a network-
based rendition of the modular theory of brain function (which postulates that each 
functional area of the brain has a singular role), thus subdividing the DMN in order to 
accommodate the diversity of ascribed functions (Andrews-Hanna et al, 2010). 
Much of this empirical and conceptual research on the default mode, it should be 
emphasized, has drawn extensively on findings and formulations from a range of other 
sub-domains of cognitive neuroscience. Regardless, however, of the cohesiveness of the 
cognitive constructs as they were fitted within the emergent DMN model, or of the 
precise spatial distribution of the responsible network, a cognitive neuroscience of inner 
experience was taking form through linking the functional roles of brain regions that are 
more activated during the state of rest with the psychology of unconstrained mental 
activity.  
 
2.2 History of resting state research: Lineage II – spontaneous brain activity 
We have thus far focused on cognitive neuropsychology as it established the 
foundations and terminology for studying the brain’s function in the psychological state 
of rest. However, interest in ‘resting’ brain activity, albeit of a different sort, preceded 
Shulman and colleagues’ ‘Flipping of the Contrasts’ in 1997. Bharat Biswal and other 
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physicist colleagues, who were then based at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee, 
were working under the guidance of James Hyde (a pioneer in the development of fMRI 
technologies). Rather than asking the neuropsychological question posed by Shulman and 
colleagues, they posed a parallel question about the role of the spontaneous activity that 
was discarded as noise in analytic models.
4
 Instead of inquiring about a functionally 
relevant psychological baseline condition, Biswal and colleagues explored the possibility 
that baseline physiological activity might be functionally significant and reflect neural 
organization.  
That spontaneous neurophysiological activity was functionally relevant was not a 
new idea,
5
 but it had fallen behind the hypothesis of the input-output model driving 
behavioural psychology. If the brain were instead primarily driven by the requirement to 
maintain its own dynamics, with environmental input only modulating, rather than 
driving its function, the spontaneous endogenous dynamics would be meaningful and not 
simply unconstrained noise. Biswal and colleagues addressed this question in 1995 with a 
remarkably simple paradigm (Biswal et al, 1995). They began with a standard finger-
tapping task in a ‘boxcar’ design (see Figure 2), in which the task – or ‘on’ – condition 
(here, ‘finger-tapping’) occurs in several experimental ‘blocks’, each of which is 
separated by a period of non-task, ‘off’ time. Expectedly, the motor cortex was activated 
more during tapping than during the resting-condition. Their innovation was to then take 
data collected from the same subjects during a rest-only condition and to analyse the 
correlation of the spontaneous fluctuations occurring between a small portion of selected 
motor cortex and the rest of the brain. They found that the same areas of motor cortex 
activated during the tapping-task were spontaneously correlated at rest (Figure 4). The 
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notion that spatially remote areas of the brain could be spontaneously correlated, and that 
such a relationship served as a measure function-based connectivity, was not new 
(Friston et al, 1993). However, the observation that ‘functional connectivity’ during a 
resting-state contained similar neural organization as task-evoked patterns of activity was 
indeed novel. Here, the title of their seminal article: ‘Functional connectivity in the motor 
cortex of resting human brain using echo-planar MRI,’ reflects the union of fields that 
was to follow almost a decade later. Thus, it appeared that the brain was functionally 
coordinated into spatially consistent areas even in a task-independent state of rest. 
 
***** INSERT FIGURE 4 SOMEWHERE NEAR HERE ***** 
From an analytic perspective the transition was easy, although it took almost a 
decade to overcome the field’s bias. The only difference from task-based data analysis 
was the derivation of the statistical model: rather than hypothesize the fMRI response 
from an environmental stimulus and test which areas of the brain may be correlated, the 
data themselves provide the model. The data processing tools remain largely the same, 
but the statistical model shifts from externally to internally defined. The theoretical shift, 
on the other hand, is from localization of functional areas to delineating connectivity and 
large-scale functional networks (Van Dijk et al, 2010; Bullmore and Sporns, 2009). 
Numerous publications have used functional connectivity analysis of resting state fMRI 
data to map neuroanatomical systems (Margulies et al, 2007; Di Martino et al, 2008; Roy 
et al, 2009; Krienen and Buckner, 2009; Vincent et al, 2008; Smith et al, 2009), 
differentiate patient groups (Greicius, 2008; Fornito and Bullmore, 2010; Seeley et al, 
2009; Fox and Greicius, 2010), and map developmental changes (Kelly et al, 2009; Fair 
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et al, 2009; Fransson et al, 2007). The approach has been used to investigate functional 
brain differences in groups and topics that would otherwise not be capable of task 
participation, such as other species (Margulies et al, 2009; Vincent et al, 2007; Vincent et 
al, 2010; Biswal and Kannurpatti, 2009), and different levels of consciousness in humans 
(Boly et al, 2008; Horovitz et al, 2008; Fukunaga et al, 2006). Since all that is required 
during data collection is that the participant remains motionless in the scanner 
environment, resting state fMRI data has also opened the possibility of data-sharing 
across institutions on an unprecedented scale (Biswal et al, 2010). With the recent 
publication of Biswal and colleagues’ multi-site study, consisting of over 1000 datasets 
(in a field which usually does not exceed a few dozen per study), the field of functional 
imaging seems at the cusp of large-scale population studies, and shares the excitement 
and research aspirations with which genetics entered the last decade. 
 
2.3 Consolidating the ‘resting-state’ field of research 
The links between the field of dynamic physiological properties in the resting 
human brain with the field of dynamic psychological properties in the resting human 
brain were not as obvious as they perhaps might now seem. Biswal’s findings were not 
initially popular within the imaging community, and cognitive neuroscience did not know 
how to integrate Raichle’s work. One may conjecture that the two groups were either 
unaware of (or unaware of how to link) each other’s work, as no cross citations exist 
prior to 2003.
6
  
A young researcher named Michael Greicius who was working in the laboratory of 
Vinod Menon at Stanford University made the connection. His article, published in 
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences and edited by Raichle, was entitled 
‘Functional connectivity in the resting brain [note the Biswal reference]: a network 
analysis of the default mode hypothesis [note the Raichle reference]’ (Greicius et al, 
2003). At the core of the study was the resting state functional connectivity technique 
developed by Biswal: Greicius and colleagues found that the regions more activated 
during the baseline state were also intrinsically correlated at rest. The unification of these 
two fields, one neuropsychological, the other physiological, and both essentially a break 
with the dominant model of input-output brain function, marked the beginning of what 
we now know as ‘resting-state fMRI’. It was here that Greicius and colleagues coined the 
functional-anatomical term that has become almost synonymous with the name of the 
field itself: the ‘default-mode network’. It was this network, they argued, that 
‘account[ed], in large part, for the phenomenon of task-related decreases in brain activity’ 
(Greicius et al, 2003, p. 256). The blending of the two fields is most exemplified by a 
statement by Raichle and Snyder from a response paper published in 2007 in the journal 
NeuroImage: ‘The important distinction is not between “rest” and “task” but rather 
between intrinsic and evoked activity’ (Raichle and Snyder, 2007, p. 1088).  
The yoking of the physiological and the psychological approaches to one another 
has meant that, even as the ‘resting state’ research field now appears to be a unitary one, 
it retains within it distinct theoretical foundations and terminologies. This theoretical 
fecundity has been advantageous in terms of sparking wide-ranging empirical research as 
well as giving extra impetus to model building. But it has also meant that the ‘resting 
state’ and the mapping of the cognitive function of the default mode network are 
frequently conflated. On the one side is interest in how the brain functions and organizes 
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through spontaneous, intrinsically-driven activity, while on the other side research is 
primarily invested in characterizing the psychological state (and corresponding brain 
state) during the absence of specific environmentally-driven task demands. By uniting 
both fields under one banner, they flank each other to criticism directed at either side, and 
offer a wider landscape of interpretation – in many cases due to the use of loose 
terminology and interpretation. The creative semiotic terrain produced through the 
mixing of these terminologies has aided and will, we suggest, continue to aid the 
transmission of this research into other disciplinary arenas and into the public sphere. 
 
2.4 Resisting rest 
Raichle and Snyder’s insistence that the important distinction was not between rest 
and task, but rather between intrinsic and evoked activity marked a distinct shift from the 
call-to-research of Raichle and colleagues’ 2001 articles. Notably, Raichle and Snyder’s 
formulation was not self-standing, but rather appeared as a central element in their 
defence of resting state research against a stringent critique launched by two researchers, 
Alexa Morcom and Paul Fletcher, who were attached to a dominant hub of cognitive 
neuroimaging, the Brain Mapping Unit at the University of Cambridge. Morcom and 
Fletcher’s paper (2007) – provocatively entitled ‘Does the brain have a baseline? Why we 
should be resisting a rest’ – marked the first explicit challenge to the maturing field of 
resting state research.
7
 The paper did not dispute Raichle and colleagues’ characterization 
of the resting state as ‘active’, but rather attempted to undermine ‘its claim to a special 
status’ [italics added] (p. 1080). Indeed, the paper used the adjective ‘special’ a number 
of times – and each in the context of clarifying Morcom and Fletcher’s central argument 
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that acknowledgement of the resting state in no way entailed a need to refocus attention 
away from the task-based manipulations long familiar to cognitive neuroscience. On 
Morcom and Fletcher’s account, in short, a focus on the intrinsic activity of the resting 
brain carried the danger of ‘imply[ing] that it has somewhat mysterious functions not 
amenable to study using “tasks”’ [italics added] (p. 1078). Since, for them, task-based 
paradigms were essential for any progress to be made vis-à-vis how the brain supports 
cognition, and since ‘the cognitive nature of rest is at present almost entirely a matter of 
speculation’ (p. 1079), the implications were clear: the cognitive characteristics of the 
resting state required investigation through the use of appropriate tasks. ‘[M]odern 
systems neuroscience’ must, after all, they argued, ‘be sophisticated in cognitive, as well 
as physiological and network terms’ (p.1081). Morcom continued in the same vein in 
subsequent interviews, critiquing the DMN theory as ‘very unpsychological’ (Jarrett, 
2009, p. 838); she was joined by Sam Gilbert, a colleague at another world-leading 
cognitive neuroscience department, that of University College London (UCL), who 
reiterated that ‘The DMN literature reflects ... a decognitivisation of cognitive 
neuroscience’ (Jarrett, 2009, p. 838).  
What is striking about Morcom and Fletcher’s critique is their need to downplay 
any disturbance that the constructs of ‘the resting state’ and the DMN might be bringing 
about within the established field of cognitive neuroscience. The frequency of their use of 
the word ‘special’; their refusal to bestow upon the resting state ‘a privileged status’ in 
the study of human behaviour; their antipathy towards granting the resting brain 
‘somewhat mysterious functions’ that operate outside of the fold of task-based 
paradigms: each of these rhetorical moves emphasizes the authors’ conviction that it is 
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cognition – and its exploration via the use of highly controlled, task-based designs – that 
must remain at the heart of the neuroscientific exploration of the brain. Their paper, then, 
points to an ongoing and pivotal debate surrounding the resting state field: the extent to 
which its model of brain (and self) endorses orthodox cognitive conceptions and the 
extent to which it departs from them.  
 
3 Interlude: ‘rest’ and ‘default’ 
Before it is possible to begin to formulate a preliminary response to this question, it is 
necessary to stand back from the intricacies of the manoeuvres we have been tracking in order 
to reflect on the wider semantic terrain inhabited by this emergent scientific field.  What, in 
short, do the terms ‘rest’ and ‘default’ denote? Both are complex and polysemic. This adds to 
the difficulty of discerning if and how the resting state research field fits within, or moves 
beyond, the orthodox cognitivism of much of the wider neuroscientific terrain.  It also adds to 
the likelihood that there will be a creative multiplication of meanings and connotations as 
findings and formulations are disseminated beyond academic circles.  
 
3.1 ‘Default’ 
The current meaning of default – a condition that obtains in the absence of active 
intervention – is etymologically very recent. The Oxford English Dictionary traces its use to 
1966: to define a preselected option adopted by a computer when no alternative is specified 
by the user or programmer.
8
 Here, the ‘default’ is something that is specifically programmed 
into a system, rather than being immanent to it. But the artificiality of the system disappears 
once the term travels beyond the realm of programming, such that the ‘default’ connotes the 
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neutral state of the system – how it might act in the absence of interventions/stimuli. Such a 
‘neutral state’ easily slides towards connoting the core, functional state of the system, and 
from there, to what the system most ‘naturally’ returns to.  
 For anyone who is at all familiar with computers, a ‘default’ setting of the brain is 
therefore likely to be an easy concept to grasp. There are two points to make here vis-à-vis the 
close relationship that the term ‘default’ establishes between the brain and the computer. One 
is the straightforward one that the dissemination of resting state/default mode research is 
likely to be rendered easier by the fact that the adjective ‘default’ is part of lay terminology – 
at least for those familiar with computers.  The second is the more interesting: over the last 
quarter century, computers have had an enormous impact on our understandings and 
conceptualizations of both the brain (‘the brain as computer’) and the self (e.g. Turkle, 1995).  
In other words, any influence that resting state research has on everyday conceptualizations of 
the brain and self is likely to be carried on the back of the already powerful influences that the 
computer and computing have on such conceptualizations.
9
  
 
3.2 ‘Rest’ 
This term has, of course, a rich philosophical, anthropological, religious and 
sociological – as well as biological and physiological – history. It is therefore 
metaphorically and metonymically very rich, a characteristic that has been exploited to 
the full by scientists, external commentators and critics when discussing research on the 
resting state.
 
(Those of us who are social scientists ought not to imagine that the term 
‘rest’ has lain uninterrogated by those within the field. Indeed, resting state researchers – 
along with their interlocutors – have done much conceptual ground-clearing vis-à-vis the 
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difficulties of the term.) The etymology of ‘rest’, as described by the Oxford English 
Dictionary, indicates that uses of the word have included: a natural repose or relief from 
activity; the intermission of labour or exertion (hence the Sabbath as the day of rest); 
freedom from distress or trouble; quiet or tranquillity of mind; an interval of silence or a 
pause (in music); the cessation of motion; and continuance in the same position or place. 
In this sense, rest can variously be regarded as the opposite of: activity, busyness, labour, 
movement, restlessness and agitation. Hints of several of these meanings are to be found 
within the scientific and popular literature on the resting state and the DMN.  And, as we 
shall later discuss, this literature is engaged in a substantial reconfiguration of several of 
the term’s uses.   
 
4 Paradigms contrasted: the subject (not) at rest 
 
The previous sections have attempted to depict the complexity of the field of 
transformations produced through the emergence of the resting state research field and 
the proclamation of a new paradigm in functional neuroimaging. These transformations 
have been not only methodological, but have been accompanied by disciplinary 
disturbances as well as ontological and epistemological shifts in how the brain is 
conceptualized and scientifically interrogated.  
In the remainder of the paper, we analyse in greater detail some of the potential 
implications of these transformations for models of brain, self and subjectivity. We start 
with a schematic depiction of the ‘old’ and the ‘new paradigm’ (see Table 1). The cells in 
each column are synthesized from representations that those within the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
categories have used to characterize their own and the other paradigm; portrayals of these 
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paradigms in popular literature; and our own analyses of the typifying features of each.
 
It 
is easy to critique such a bifurcation. But while the table provides an overly schematic 
division of what is in actuality a much more heterogeneous field, we nonetheless believe 
that it is helpful to articulate some of these differences starkly so as to gain greater 
analytical purchase on what might be at stake in Raichle’s announcement of a ‘paradigm 
shift’ in functional brain imaging. It is, nonetheless, important to keep in mind that the 
shifts effected by the resting state/DMN field are part of a much larger and heterogeneous 
series of changes in how neuroscientists are conceptualizing the brain and the self. In 
other words, we should not be misled into believing that the ‘new paradigm’ has arisen 
through findings, constructs and methods developed solely by resting state/default mode 
researchers. 
 
* * * * * INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE * * * * * 
The final third of Table 1 indicates how the methods and objects of resting state 
research specified in the second third of the table potentially catalyse a new model of 
brain and self within cognitive neuroscience. The intrigue with and focus on non-
observable and unconstrained mental activity, for example, contributes to the emergence 
of an account of the self grounded as much through mind-wandering and introspection as 
through deliberate, goal-focused activity; the focus on the rhythm of the intrinsic and 
spontaneous dynamics of the brain contributes to the emergence of an account of the self 
specified through and anchored by those dynamics rather than through her responses to 
the environment and the exteroceptive stimuli that impinge upon her. And the shift in 
focus to slow frequencies on a multi-second scale, much closer to the rhythms of 
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phenomenal perception, is a fortuitous by-product of using fMRI with its slow temporal 
resolution to explore psychological and physiological dynamics (rather than 
electroencephalography, which traditionally only addresses fluctuations faster than one 
second – much closer to a time-scale of interest to neurons).  
As resting state and DMN findings begin to be disseminated, it is possible to 
discern already how they are being used to ground particular visions both of the self and 
of the intimate tie between brain and self. The neuroscientists Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli 
and John Gabrieli, for example, in an online article for Scientific American about the 
default mode have suggested that the: 
 
exciting discoveries about the resting human brain raise the question of whether 
we are gaining the novel capacity to measure quantitatively our most intimate and 
unique inner selves. Are you most “you” when you’re racing through work? Or 
when you’re simply sitting in a chair, mind adrift, just being? (Whitfield-Gabrieli 
and Gabrieli, 2010) 
 
Raichle, himself, in a recent cover feature for the Scientific American, writes:  
 
The brain’s default mode of function serves as a master organizer of its dark 
energy. Over time neural dark energy may ultimately be revealed as the very 
essence of what makes us tick. (Raichle, 2010, p. 49) 
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If, as Nikolas Rose has argued, the spaces of contemporary biomedicine and biopolitics 
are opening up ‘new ideas of what human beings are’ (Rose, 2007, p. 6), then there 
appear already to be indications that the resting state and the DMN might be installed as a 
new foundation for the self. In the two quotations above, it is the subject ‘at rest’ that – 
by dint of her default mode brain activity – potentially holds the key to subjectivity tout 
court. We can see the ease with which the analytical distance between resting state data, 
models of DMN activity, and claims about the nature of subjectivity can be flattened.  
The explosive growth of resting state research has, then, started to make its mark 
felt beyond the laboratory. In the process, ‘rest’ has been rewritten to comprise various 
active, internal psychological states. The past century of experimental psychology was 
built upon those aspects of cognition that it could modulate and measure externally. The 
emergence of the concept of a default mode of neural and psychological activity has 
impinged on the inner territory of the subject, and, in the process, has contributed to 
renewed interest in developing experimental paradigms that would investigate this 
territory. In little more than a decade, the ‘task induced deactivations’ noticed by 
Shulman and colleagues have moved from being a complete mystery, to being configured 
as a coherent network that has been described in ScienceNews as ‘one of the hardest-
working systems in the brain’ – ‘despite its laid-back name’ (Saey, 2009, p. 16). Rest – to 
follow Raichle in his frequent use of a quotation from Seneca – has in this formulation 
certainly become ‘far from restful’.10 
 We wish to comment on one particularly noticeable consequence of this 
reconfiguration of ‘rest’, not least because it significantly reorients some of the previous 
assumptions and guiding models used within the humanities and social sciences to 
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describe and conceptualize a self who is not engaged in deliberate and purposive activity. 
It is our contention that the reconfiguration of rest has helped to consolidate a model of 
the resting brain as a matrix that is constituted as perpetually productive, as intrinsically 
creative, and as thrown towards the future. While many of the research findings that 
ground such a model in fact existed prior to the emergence of the default mode/resting 
state literature, they arguably required the compelling image of the brain as exhibiting 
‘unrest at rest’ in order to circulate more widely.  
Most notably, the increased focus on the importance of mind-wandering and 
daydreaming in no way gainsays the brain’s industriousness. Buckner and colleagues, for 
example, in describing resting state activity, speculate that: ‘Rather than let the moments 
pass with idle brain activity, we capitalize on them to consolidate past experience in ways 
that are adaptive for our future needs’ (Buckner et al, 2008, p. 31). Raichle and Snyder 
make no bones about the fact that, for them, study of the default mode of the brain 
enhances investigation of ‘the real reason we have a brain’11: ‘not to reminisce about the 
past nor react in the moment but, rather, to envision the future’ (Raichle and Snyder, 
2007, p. 1089). The brain, on Raichle’s account, functions as a kind of ‘Bayesian 
inference engine’ through which it is able to generate predictions of the future, and to link 
these predictions with its reflections on the past. Such abilities are, moreover, central to 
‘the development of unique human attributes such as imagination and creativity’ 
(Raichle, 2006, p. 1250). Unsurprisingly, then, as this research travels through popular 
science publications – and thence more broadly to a number of publics – the use of tropes 
of productivity to characterize states of only apparent idleness, multiply. As Saey puts it: 
‘It may be off when you're on, but the brain network behind daydreams and a sense of 
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self is no slacker’ (Saey, 2009, p. 16). (It is notable that resting state research employs 
tropes of industriousness and the desire for ‘no-backlog’ that are of a piece with today’s 
discourses regarding neo-liberalism. There remains much to be explored vis-à-vis how to 
understand and interpret the often unacknowledged isomorphism between models of the 
brain and models of socio-economic organization (Martin, 2007; Malabou, 2008).)  
The model of mind-wandering as industriousness is in distinct contrast to those 
accounts of day-dreaming and mind wandering that dominated late nineteenth and 
twentieth-century philosophy and social theory. For Freud, for example, the key 
conceptual term in his famous essay ‘Writers and day-dreaming’ is play; this is ‘serious 
play’, certainly, but play nonetheless (Freud, 1908). Freud’s mind is one in which ‘hardly 
anything is harder for a man than to give up a pleasure which he has once experienced’. 
Indeed, the subject does not give something up but exchanges one thing for another, such 
that as the child grows, he ‘builds castles in the air’ rather than castles made out of bricks. 
The contrast between Freud’s formulation (in which subjectivity is weighted by the pull 
of the past) and that of Raichle and Buckner (with the subject’s adaptive orientation to 
the future, even – perhaps especially – in its consolidation of memory) could not be more 
marked.
12
  
The gap that separates some of those philosophical interrogations of memory and 
subjectivity so central to modernity from current research findings associated with the 
default mode can also be discerned through the repositioning of that most redolent of 
symbolic objects: Proust’s madeleine. Visual neuroscientist Moshe Bar, in two articles 
that address the ‘proactive brain’ (Bar, 2007; Bar, 2009), elaborates how such a brain 
when ‘not engaged in some demanding and all-consuming task’ (Bar, 2009, p. 1238) – 
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continuously generates predictions by ‘proactively linking’ incoming features to existing, 
familiar information. Bar argues that there is a ‘striking overlap’ between the cortical 
network mediating contextual associative processing and the default network. Such a 
model means that for Bar there is in fact a ‘payoff’ for the brain’s investment of energy in 
‘mind wandering, fantasizing and revisiting (and modifying) existing memories’ (Bar, 
2009, p. 1239): what appear to be random thoughts and ‘aimless’ mental simulations 
create memories. Crucially, he explicitly contrasts his model, in which acquired memory 
is important for future survival and adaptation with the environment, with one of the key 
loci for conceptualizations of memory in modernity: 
 
Consequently, the cardinal purpose of memory starts to seem less for leisured 
reminiscing, as in the famous example of Proust’s Madeleine, and more as a 
knowledge-base that guides our lives in an increasingly more informed manner. (Bar, 
2007, p. 286)  
  
Let us set to one side Bar's unique characterization of a moment in Swann's Way in which 
Proust narrates the surfacing of memory as peremptory and compelled as a moment of 
'leisured reminiscence'. Instead, note how the 'pay off' that Bar reads into the brain's 
investment in mind-wandering and fantasizing is one that points to a model of mental 
activity in which the potential for the designless, footloose and aimless is converted into 
the purposive, generative and aimful.  
The reconceptualisation of rest is also contributing to the reframing of older, 
analytical frameworks and constructs that functioned in a binary manner. One way in 
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which William James, for example, divided the field of consciousness was to oppose 
attention to the state of absentmindedness conjured up by the French term distraction and 
the German Zerstreutheit. For James, it was the abolition of the state of distraction
13  
that 
signalled the awakening of the attention (James, 1890, pp. 404–405). In contrast, the 
model of attention being developed in the DMN literature reformulates absentmindedness 
or mind-wandering as a form of introspective attention. Here, network brain activity ‘at 
rest’ is mapped on to the psychological category of attention, such that attention’s 
opposite no longer exists. Instead, we have two types of attention – the intro- and the 
extrospective. The neuroscientist Peter Fransson, in a similar manoeuvre, argues that 
activity during the default mode disallows the possibility that one might, metaphorically 
speaking, ‘lose track of oneself’. While he acknowledges that there is still uncertainty as 
regards the ‘exact function of this core of intrinsic activity’, he speculates that: 
 
it represents unconscious and continuously on-going processes that are necessary to 
maintain a coherent neuronal representation of the “self.” We believe that irrespective 
of how focused we are on a specific task [such task-based focus implies lower levels 
of DMN activity] and no matter how computationally demanding that task is, we 
cannot, metaphorically speaking, “lose track of ourselves”. At all times, the brain 
needs to have a coherent mental model of the self. Cognitive faculties that might be 
administered by this model include having a sense of who we are and where in space 
we are and the passage of time. (Fransson, 2006, p. 2844) 
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Fransson’s claim that the brain's unceasing and coherent mental model of the self might 
administer cognitive functions that include such fundamental subjective categories as the 
'sense of who we are', conjures up a conception of the self that is unable to lose its 
moorings or, in short, to unfix itself from its self. If the resting state and DMN literature 
present a brain and a self preoccupied with daydreaming and fantasy, and characterised 
by unconstrained mental activity, such activities should, in fact, be regarded as tethered 
and directed rather than formless and indeterminate.
14
  
 
5 The subject at rest moves elsewhere 
We have described how resting state research, as well as disseminations of resting 
state research within the popular literature, are reconceptualising models of brain and self 
within – and potentially outside of – the neurosciences. While such transformations are in 
certain ways building on – and committed to expanding – already established cognitivist 
frameworks (e.g. note the use and extension of standard psychological constructs such as 
attention), they are, we suggest, simultaneously delineating a rather different account of 
the self, one which is ripe for movement into other fields. In this final section: (i) we 
briefly indicate potential points of convergence between this different account of the self 
and current areas of preoccupation within the humanities and the social sciences; and (ii) 
speculate on the ways in which dissemination of resting state research might take place.  
The animating force within the humanities and social sciences for much of the 
ongoing interest in neuroscientific research is a frustration with the Cartesian subject (and 
its corollary, the cognitivist self), and a search for models of the brain, the self and the 
body that can be interpreted as offering an alternative. That the resting state field in many 
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ways positions itself as departing from some of the constraints of cognitive psychology – 
both in terms of its methods and its modelling of the self – is likely to increase its 
attractions, therefore, to those preoccupied by the limits to cognitivism. This research 
field emphasizes the phenomena of daydreaming and mind-wandering; it moves away 
from the technics and analytics of stimulus and response, and towards a model in which 
variability in behaviour and perception are modulated by endogenous, somatic 
fluctuations (see Table 1). Such preoccupations are shared by many of those currently 
working within the humanities and the social sciences on how to conceptualize, interpret 
and bring to life bodily and psychological movement (e.g. (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999; 
Henriques, 2010)). Undoubtedly, the attention being given within resting state / DMN 
research to the delineation and interpretation of a complex internal world cannot but be of 
interest to those weary of the cognitive orthodoxy in which it is the subject’s responses to 
environmental stimuli that is the primary conceptual lens for analysis.  
But it is apposite to consider some of the potential dangers of interdisciplinary 
intersection. Resting state research is dependent on a whole series of neuroscientific 
findings from numerous disciplinary specialisms. Such research therefore employs a 
heterogeneous and complex set of constructs – such as ‘self’, ‘self-processing’ and 
attention – that have complex genealogies even within the terrain of the neurosciences, let 
alone outside of them. As the field of neuroscientific resting state research grows and 
begins the process of consolidation, there is an inevitable process of black-boxing – both 
of constructs and of experimental findings (Latour, 1987, p. 131). Much of the analytic 
elegance as well as potency of the concept of the DMN, for example, derives from the 
way in which it has been mapped on to a series of other complex, and heterogeneous 
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constructs that, we argue, characterize its function and mode of operation. Thus for 
example, scientific discussions within the field operate with key distinctions being made 
between: introspection/exterospection; self-related and/non-self-related; and ‘internally 
focused’/‘externally focused’. It is important to understand how and with what theoretical 
consequences such distinctions have been consolidated through experimental designs as 
well as through model building.  Consider, for example, how the following quotation 
gathers together items under the umbrella category of the ‘self-referential’:  
 
the DMN is involved in the evaluation of potentially survival-salient information 
from the body and the world: perspective taking of the desires, beliefs, and 
intentions of others and in remembering the past as well as planning the future (2–
4). All of these putative functions are self-referential in nature. (Sheline et al, 
2009) 
 
There is an extensive body of research within the humanities and social sciences that has 
interrogated both historically and conceptually how different models of self imply very 
different conceptualizations of ‘perspective taking’ (e.g. through different theories of 
identification, empathy and the theory of other minds, e.g. (Leys, 1993)); of relations to 
one’s body and to the world; and of how to articulate the relation between self and other, 
past and present. How and in what sense ‘[a]ll … [the] putative functions’ that Sheline 
describes in the quotation above are to be conceptualized as ‘self-referential’, as well as 
operationalized experimentally, begs a significant analytic as well as methodological 
question. There is need for caution, then, is assessing scientific research that associates 
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the DMN with ‘self-referential functions’, let alone with aspects of the self per se – and 
the social sciences and humanities may have much to contribute (Choudhury et al, 2009) 
to ongoing debates within the already multidisciplinary resting state neuroscientific 
research field. 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
It is becoming increasingly common to argue that neuroscience is reshaping 
models of subjectivity and personhood in the West. On one such account, that of 
Fernando Vidal, an historian of the human sciences, the human being is now 'specified by 
the property of «brainhood», i.e. the property or quality of being, rather than simply 
having a brain’ (Vidal, 2009, p. 5). To assess Vidal’s contention regarding ‘brainhood’ – 
that to be a human being today is to ‘be a brain’ – demands that we understand what ‘a 
brain’, today, is. How, in other words, is the brain that is said to underpin our personhood 
being conceptualized within and beyond the neuroscientific laboratories? Brains that are 
emotional, brains that are neuroplastic, and brains that are characterized by mirror 
neurons are arguably beginning to make significant inroads into public discourse, and to 
be themselves subjected to critical interrogation (Rubin, 2009; Rees, 2010). But while the 
emergent field of resting state research is, as we have demonstrated, already making a 
significant impact both empirically and conceptually within the neurosciences, it has as 
yet not been subject to any sustained critical analysis from a perspective not wholly 
embedded within neuroscience. 
 That has been the task we have set ourselves in this paper, through offering a 
schematic outline of the field’s genealogy and an initial assessment of how it is 
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reconfiguring models of brain-environment relations and of the self. The field could be 
characterized as one element within a larger and heterogeneous set of research practices 
that are challenging and reorienting certain features of orthodox cognitive neuroscience. 
The impact and extent of the field’s reorderings within as well as beyond the 
neurosciences are not yet clear. What is clear is that this nascent field is both deeply 
engaged with and raising to greater visibility many problematics – mind-wandering and 
day-dreaming, somatic rhythms, introspection, memory and the anticipation of the future, 
the consolidation and experiencing of the self – that are also topics of live debate and 
enquiry within the social sciences and the humanities. Both these latter disciplinary 
domains are, moreover, currently preoccupied with how to use and respond to insights 
from other fields of expertise when conducting conceptual and empirical explorations of 
self and subjectivity.  
We have indicated how the resting state research field has reworked most of these 
axes such that the resting brain is now characterized by ceaseless activity, exertion, 
industriousness and movement. (The only axis that has not obviously been reworked is 
the affectively freighted axis that opposes rest to agitation, distress or trouble.) We have 
also seen the ease with which the focus can move between analysing a ‘resting’ state 
metabolically, physiologically and psychologically. Resting state researchers’ 
characterizations of the ‘resting brain’ are, indeed, largely intended to be 
characterizations of the brain (whether at a metabolic, physiological or psychological 
level).
15
 Nonetheless, neuroscientific styles of thought are frequently underpinned by 
what Vidal has described as a ‘brain-self-consubstantiality’ (Vidal, 2009, p. 7), such that 
the ‘self’ quickly becomes co-terminous with those attributes of the brain. As research 
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findings regarding the resting state and the DMN move further afield, then, it becomes 
likely that the industriousness of a daydreaming brain will metonymically and 
additionally become an account of the industriousness of a daydreaming subject. Such a 
process will be assisted by the ease with which the concept of the ‘default’ in the default 
mode literature has shifted from meaning that which is programmed into a system, to that 
which is the neutral state of the system, to that which the system ‘naturally’ returns to – 
and hence, perhaps, to connoting the ‘core’ of the very human subject. 
What is noticeable in the rise to visibility of resting state research is the language 
used to describe and conceptualize the new scientific object. Both the specialist and 
popular scientific literature frequently employ tropes connoting wildness or an underside 
when describing the resting state and the DMN. Raichle’s two papers (one specialist, one 
popular science) entitled ‘The brain’s dark energy’ (Raichle, 2006; Raichle, 2010) point 
to a fundamental and mysterious property of the brain; Jarrett (in a popular article), 
comments, in a similar vein, that ‘Perhaps resting brain activity, and the mind-wandering 
it gives rise to, is psychology’s very own dark matter’ (Jarrett, 2009). Others invoke the 
well-worn trope of exploration: leading neuroscientist Giulio Tononi describes ‘the 
discovery of a major system within the brain, an organ within an organ, that hid for 
decades right before our eyes’, and comments that ‘It’s like finding a new continent’ 
(Tononi, quoted in (Glausiusz, 2009)). Buckner and Vincent explain that ‘We are in 
uncharted territory’ (Buckner and Vincent, 2007, p. 1095). But the very moment at which 
this mysterious new object comes into view is also the moment in which there is a drive 
either to rebut its strangeness (e.g. Morcom and Fletcher’s unease that ‘mysterious 
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functions’ might be attributed to the resting brain (Morcom and Fletcher, 2007)), or to 
render the new object co-terminous with other, more familiar knowledges and constructs.  
In the course of the paper, we have argued that the ‘new continent’ of the default 
mode network is – as it is ushered into the light – being mapped, filled in, and hence 
reconceptualised as positivity. In the process, many of the previous characteristics and 
connotations of ‘rest’, and the constructs associated with it, are being reframed and/or 
overturned. In the eagerness with which ‘rest’ is being redescribed as the brain’s 
industriousness, the moment of uncovering the mystery of the resting state is also, 
perhaps, the moment in which its mystery is colonized. Resting state research has helped 
to open up to neuroscience what was hitherto unquantifiable inner experience, and, in so 
doing, has destabilized many of the assumptions built into the models of cognitive 
science. For the social sciences and humanities to engage with resting state research, 
then, holds open the possibility of engaging with, and contributing to the building of, a 
different model of the self and of subjectivity from that one familiar to us by dint of the 
dominance of orthodox cognitive psychology. But we have also argued that the resting 
state field is simultaneously engaged in a reworking of cognitive constructs (such as 
attention and of memory). Default mode network research is both intimate with sub-fields 
within (orthodox) cognitive neuroscience and dependent upon them. The openings 
beyond cognitivism could, then, also  be in the process of being shut down: memory, for 
example, is further dissociated from Proust and instead configured as a ‘knowledge base’ 
with which ‘to guide our lives’. We write at a moment in which to borrow from resting 
state research enables the possibility of borrowing in a currency different from that of 
cognitive – and cognitivist – science. Whether those exchanges will take place in a 
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different currency or, as both the resting state field and the exchanges grow, return to the 
same currency, remains to be seen.  
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Notes: 
1
 It is far from clear whether the arrival of resting state research heralds a ‘paradigm shift’ 
in the strictly Kuhnian sense.  In the wider research project – of which this paper is but 
one part – we are attempting to trace in greater detail the epistemological, technological 
and material contexts that surrounded the emergence of this field. 
2 
We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for reminding us of these precedents.
 
3 
Buckner and colleagues (Buckner et al, 2008) note that references to 'default mode' are 
first found in the literature on cognition, in other words prior to the term's appearance in 
explanations of neural and metabolic phenomena.  
4
 For a visual example of the temporal dynamics in an fMRI dataset, see: Daniel 
Margulies and Chris Sharp, Untitled (The effect of Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring and 
Kant’s 3rd Critique on the human brain: a functional magnetic resonance imaging 
approach) at <http://vimeo.com/9871689>, which presents real-time fMRI data of a 
single individual listening to music. Similar fluctuations are also present in the absence of 
any overt sensory or behavioural activity. 
5
 e.g., David Ingvar's research (Ingvar, 1985) on high resting blood flow in prefrontal 
cortex, which he attributed to spontaneous self-generated mental activity of the resting 
human brain. 
6 
The assertion that the research communities were independent from one another prior to 
2003 can be justified by the lack of any prior cross citations. This claim is supported by 
the consistency with which Raichle cites Biswal as the seminal researcher in the field in 
articles and lectures appearing after 2003 (for example: 
<video.google.com/videoplay?docid=7393045011768458913>). From the perspective of 
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the surrounding research community, personal correspondence with numerous 
neuroimaging researchers supports the early general neglect of the ‘task-induced 
deactivations’ Raichle was describing. Likewise, Biswal’s findings ran so contrary to the 
popular assumptions in the field that his findings were attacked (personal 
communication). Another example comes from the closing discussion of the first 
international conference on resting state research in December 2008, where a participant 
commended Biswal’s perseverance by quoting Ghandi: “First they ignore you, then they 
ridicule you, then they fight you, then you win.” To which Biswal responded: “… and we 
all know what happened to Ghandi … they shot him.”  
7
 This critique came rather late: the paper was initially received by the journal in the 
summer of 2006 — more than half a decade after the publication of Raichle and 
colleagues’ 2001 papers. 
8 
From Weinberg’s computer programming primer (Weinberg, 1966): ‘The use of default 
attributes can contribute to the ease of writing and modifying a program’. 
9 
We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for this important point. 
10 Raichle is quoting from Seneca: ‘The fact that the body is lying down is no reason for 
supposing that the mind is at peace. Rest is … far from restful’ (Seneca, ~60 A.D. 
[1969]). Interestingly, Seneca is describing the state of individual who has not found 
serenity because his emotions are in turmoil and hence his sleep is ‘far from restful’; 
Raichle, in contrast, quotes Seneca in the service of embedding the restlessness of rest as 
a generic rather than phenomenologically (and ethically) specific condition. 
11 
Such evolutionary preoccupations abound in the cognitive neuroscience literature. A 
core question within the literature on spontaneous activity, often addressed by Raichle, is 
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what evolutionary advantage the investment of neural energy in spontaneous fluctuations 
might serve. 
12 
The accounts of mind-wandering and daydreaming that appear in resting state and 
DMN research in fact draw heavily on models developed in psychology that can be 
traced back several decades to the work of Jerome Singer and colleagues (e.g. Singer, 
1966). But any effect that such accounts might have in reorienting conceptualizations of 
the self beyond scientific circles will be by dint of their association with cognitive 
neuroscientific findings from the twenty-first century rather than psychological findings 
from the 1960s.
 
13 It is fascinating that James notes that the ‘curious state of inhibition’ that he is 
describing can be ‘produced at will by fixing the eyes on vacancy’, and that some 
individuals are able ‘voluntarily [to] empty their minds and “think of nothing”’ (James, 
1890, p. 404). James here almost exactly describes the instructions commonly given to 
research subjects in resting state studies. 
14 
Incidentally, we should note here how easily Fransson moves between the neuronal and 
the psychological. Spontaneous, intrinsic fluctuations, similar to those in the DMN, are 
ubiquitous in the brain. To claim a specific psychological role of the DMN fluctuations at 
this stage is a tempting hypothesis, but represents the blurring of distinct concepts from 
the two merging research agendas. 
15 
Characterizing the brain on a psychological level would, in this context, refer to the attempt 
to delineate a psychological state that corresponds to a baseline (or ‘neutral’) brain state.  The 
basic question that such a characterization responds to is: What is the psychological state of a 
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brain at rest?  This project points at a vertex between the two fields of Biswal (intrinsic neural 
activity) and Raichle (intrinsic psychological activity).    
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Figure and Table Captions: 
 
Figure 1: An example of a standard cross-hair used for baseline fixation during 
psychological task paradigms. 
Figure 2: Traditionally, cognitive neuroscience studies focus on the brain regions that 
covary in activity levels with a task model, as depicted here in a standard on-off ‘boxcar’ 
design. 'The Flipping of Contrasts' by Shulman and colleagues (Shulman et al, 1997) 
involved inverting the traditional contrast of 'task-over-baseline' in order to assess regions 
that were more active during the resting condition. 
Figure 3: Regions that consistently decreased in activity during task performance (later 
dubbed the 'default mode network'), as originally depicted in a meta-analysis of nine 
positron emission tomography studies by Shulman and colleagues (1997).  
Figure 4: Bharat Biswal and colleagues (1995) first demonstrated that regions involved 
in a motor tapping task (a) were also correlated in their spontaneous activity during rest 
(b).  
 
 
Acknowledgements: Felicity Callard acknowledges the ﬁnancial support of the NIHR 
Biomedical Research Centre for Mental Health, South London and Maudsley NHS 
Foundation Trust/Institute of Psychiatry (King’s College London).  Daniel Margulies 
acknowledges the financial support of the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and 
Brain Sciences, Leipzig.  They both acknowledge the creative support of The Neuro 
Bureau (Berlin), as well as the European Neuroscience and Society Network (funded by 
the European Science Foundation (ESF)) for providing the opportunity to initiate this 
   
44 
 
collaboration.   They thank the anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful suggestions, 
as well as the audiences who responded to earlier versions of this paper presented at 
symposia organized by the Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung (Berlin), 
University of Chicago/Max Planck Institute for the History of Science (Berlin), and the 
University of Edinburgh. 
   
45 
 
 
Table 1: The ‘old’ cognitive neuroscience paradigm and the ‘new’ resting state / DMN 
paradigm 
 
Old paradigm New paradigm 
Over-arching scientific framework 
Brain function largely determined by extrinsic / 
evoked activity 
Brain function largely determined by intrinsic / 
spontaneous activity 
Primacy of cognitive psychology 
Other disciplines and sub-disciplines involved / 
jostling for a space / required for the field to 
progress 
Scientific method and objects of study 
Collection of task and rest data Collection of resting state data 
Use of a controlled stimulus  No deliberate stimulus 
Psychological manipulation of experimental 
subject 
Experimental subject psychologically 
unconstrained 
Mental chronometry* 
Rendering visible of the rhythm of intrinsic 
dynamics 
Emphasis on brain activity occurring more 
rapidly than 1Hz 
Emphasis on slow temporal resting state cycles 
of 0.05 Hz 
The elicited and observable The spontaneous and internal 
Implications for conceptualization of brain and self 
Individuals are differentiated (and potentially 
classified) through their response to tasks: a 
behavioural-perceptual constitution of 
subjectivity 
Individuals are differentiated (and potentially 
classified) through the intrinsic operation of their 
DMN 
The perceiving, externally goal-directed self  The mind-wandering, internally-focused self  
Brain implicitly inactive in absence of 
environmental stimulus 
Brain always active irrespective of 
environmental stimulus 
Rest implicitly assumed to be more restful that 
‘non-rest’ 
Rest refigured into active psychological states 
Variability in behaviour & perception is noise 
Variability in behaviour & perception is 
modulated by endogenous fluctuations 
Localization specific functional modules in the Resting-state networks are more 'natural' and 
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* Mental chronometry is the use of response time in perceptual and motor tasks to infer 
the content, duration, and temporal sequencing of cognitive operations. 
brain 'core' with respect to functional divisions 
‘Self’ as a localizable conceptual representation 
‘Self’ as a distributed network in the brain, 
largely driven by spontaneous activity  
A cognitivist self Beyond the cognitivist self? 
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